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Abstract 
This paper uses a new dataset, “WATSAN,” of Private Sector Participation (PSP) projects for 
water and sanitation in developing countries to examine the determinants of the number of projects 
signed per country between 1990 and 2004. The new dataset improves on existing sources in 
particular in its coverage of projects with local investors and provides adequate data for cross-
country regression analysis.  
 
We use a negative binomial regression model to investigate the factors influencing the number of 
PSP projects in a sample of 60 developing countries with 460 PSP projects. The regression results 
provide support for the hypotheses that PSP is greater in larger markets where the ability to pay is 
higher and where governments are fiscally constrained. We test several indicators of institutional 
quality and find that these are generally significant in determining the number of projects signed 
per country. Measures of the protection of property rights and the quality of the bureaucracy 
emerge as the most important institutions that encourage PSP. Rule of law and the control of 
corruption are significant, albeit at a lower level, while the quality of contract law and political 
stability are not robustly significant.   
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1 - Introduction    
This paper focuses on the ‘handshake’: the decision by public and private sector agents or ‘partners’ to 
formalize a Private Sector Participation (PSP) project. We use data on the number of projects signed by 
country in the water sector in the 1990-2004 to analyze the determinants of deal frequency across 
countries. Building on the literature on the determinants of PSP investment volumes and on work done in 
the field of institutional economics, we test the importance of institutional, macroeconomic and ‘need’ 
characteristics of countries on their propensity to sign PSP deals using a count outcome regression model. 
The analysis employs data from a new database of PSP in Water and Sanitation (“WATSAN”) for a 
sample of 460 signed PSP projects in water and sanitation in 60 developing countries. It reveals that 
national-level institutions are a significant determinant of the number of deals signed in each country.  
 
In order to assess whether PSP is a viable and desirable approach to utility service provision, it is 
necessary to examine each stage in the project cycle, from its conception through its implementation. In 
this paper, we look specifically at an early stage in that process: signing the contract. This analysis 
contributes to an understanding of the determinants of PSP contract signature in developing countries in 
the water and sanitation sector. The findings may also be applied to other utility sectors.  
 
PSP in utility sectors has attracted a great deal of interest in the academic and policy literatures. Several 
authors have analyzed determinants of investment volumes under PSP contracts in the telecoms and power 
sectors (Henisz and Zelner 2001; Henisz 2002) but no large sample study of this kind has been conducted 
for the water sector as sufficient data are not available. The analysis of other sectors points to the 
significance of judicial and political institutions in determining investment volumes. Other authors have 
looked at the welfare outcomes and efficiency performance of PSP projects in cross-country empirical 
work and through case studies (Abdala 1996; Alcázar, Abdala et al. 2000; Alcázar, Xu et al. 2000; 
Ménard, Clarke et al. 2000a; Ménard, Clarke et al. 2000b; Shirley, Xu et al. 2000; Birdsall and Nellis 
2005). This literature also points to the importance of the institutional context. PSP performance has also 
been examined from the point of view of the firm. Estache and Pinglo (2004) and Sirtaine et al (2004) find 
that returns have not been commensurate with risks in utility PSPs.
1 Finally, interesting empirical work 
has recently been undertaken on the renegotiation of contracts using data from concessions in Latin 
America (Guasch 2004). The authors find that renegotiation is extremely common in the water sector, 
with 74 percent of contracts being renegotiated. On average, water projects were renegotiated within the 
first two years of the contract.
2 
 
This paper is distinct from the existing literature in its focus on the initial agreement on a PSP contract 
between the government and firm. This stage in the life-cycle of projects has not yet been addressed in the 
literature and allows us to make full use of the WATSAN dataset. Given our focus, we do not address 
directly the determinants of investment volumes by the private party. Similarly, the performance of PSP 
projects and the frequency of renegotiation are not central concerns for the issue that we examine in this 
paper. 
 
The WATSAN database was assembled by the authors for the purposes of this research as existing 
datasets on water PSP are incomplete in important respects. In particular, WATSAN has extensive 
coverage of projects involving local or regional investors as well as international investors. Local 
                                                      
1 Estache & Pinglo (2004) find that, for a sample of 120 PSP projects in developing countries from 1998-2002, the 
cost of equity (COE) exceeded the return on equity (ROE) in all years, for all sectors and all country-income groups. 
For the water sector, ROE were negative in two years (1999 and 2002) while COE stayed close to 10 per cent 
throughout the period. Sirtaine et al find that ROE rates in the water sector have been highly volatile from 1990-2001 
and are lower on average over this period than in the transport, telecoms and energy sectors.  
2 Guasch’s analysis of determinants of renegotiation uses a sample of 1000 concessions. For comparison, the rate of 
renegotiation is 54.7% for transport, 9.7% for electricity and 30% for all sectors.  He finds the following factors 
significantly raised the incidence of renegotiation: competitive bidding, price-cap regulation, contract award based 
on the lowest proposed tariff, contracts containing investment requirements and when a regulatory agency was not in 
place. The nationality of the concessionaire, macroeconomic shocks, political cycles and levels of corruption were 
also found to be significant.    3
investors are increasingly active in the water and sanitation sector and this is therefore an important 
addition in our dataset compared to the next best existing resource: the World Bank PPI database.
3 
 
Data collection on PSP in water is usually complicated by the municipal structure of the sector. In most 
countries, the provision of water services is the responsibility of local government and local decision-
makers may take the lead in engaging the private sector. This contrasts to the centralized structure of the 
power and telecoms sectors and the central-government led nature of privatization in those sectors. As a 
result, information on PSP projects is not necessarily collected at the national level and multiple data 
sources need to be used to fill in the gaps. Indeed, the nature of the sector also means that performance 
data is more patchy and less accurate than for other utilities.
4 As a result, the data is patchy and 
inconsistent across countries.  
 
Sufficient, reliable data is not currently available on investment volumes for water sector projects to allow 
us to analyze the determinants of investment volumes. This is largely due to the divergence between 
investment commitments made by private firms and levels of investment realized. Until more reliable data 
becomes available on realized investment for a large sample of projects in the water sector, rigorous 
analysis of investment volumes is unfortunately not possible. The analysis is also restricted by the absence 
of reliable, comparable data on sector-level institutions.
 5 Several attempts have been made to put together 
data on regulatory institutions in the water sector (Estache and Goicoechea 2005; Foster 2005), including 
by the authors of this paper, but as yet no complete dataset exists covering enough of our sample countries 
to pursue the analysis (Estache and Goicoechea 2005)
6. The addition of sector-specific regulatory 
variables would be an interesting extension to the analysis that we intend to pursue when sufficient data 
have been assembled. 
                                                      
3 The World Bank’s PPI (Private Participation in Infrastructure) Database is the usual reference point for information 
on private sector investment in infrastructure sectors. It tracks information on infrastructure projects with private 
investment in the energy, telecommunications, transport, and water and sewerage sectors in low- and middle-income 
countries. It is updated annually using commercial news databases, specialized and industry publications and internet 
resources. See: http://ppi.worldbank.org/. However, the World Bank recognizes that the database is not complete, 
especially in its coverage of the water sector where project size tends to be smaller: “The Private Participation in 
Infrastructure (PPI) Project Database lacks good coverage of small-scale providers of water and sewerage services 
because projects involving such providers usually are not reported by the sources it uses.” ((Izaguirre and Hunt 2005) 
Another source, the Water and Sanitation Sector Public Private Partnerships Database, maintained by IWE, at the 
University of Cranfield (UK) contains information on 1,300 PPP contracts announced up to 2003 using a broad 
definition of PPP, The database contains a large number of small scale partnership contracts. The data is not publicly 
available. (See http://www.silsoe.cranfield.ac.uk/iwe/cws/pppdatabase/pppdatabase.htm). PSIRU, University of 
Greenwich (UK), also maintains a database of PSP. The database is not publicly available (See www.psiru.org ) 
4 For water, international coverage data for access to “improved water supply” and “improved sanitation” is collected 
by the WHO-UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme using national sources, but it is updated irregularly as and when 
national censuses are carried out. The WHO-UNICEF Joint Monitoring Program collects data on ‘access to 
improved water supply’ and ‘access to improved sanitation’ for a large sample of countries. Cross-country data is 
available for two years: 1990 and 2002. The figures are based on data collected in national surveys or censuses in 
preceding years. See http://www.wssinfo.org/en/welcome.html     
5 A distinctive characteristic of the water sector is that PSP contracts are often agreed at the local level in the absence 
of a national regulatory framework defined in law. Instead, a set of contracts is agreed on ad hoc basis that govern 
the relationship between public authorities, state enterprises and the private sector. The details of these transactions 
are often not recorded systematically at the national level. The regulatory framework and agency are frequently 
based on contractual provisions rather than primary legislation. In effect, the regulatory regime is specific to a city or 
region. In these cases, it would be inaccurate to describe the country as having an economic regulator for the water 
sector. This raises difficulties in establishing consistent categories for comparison as well as for data collection. 
Comparing water once again to other infrastructure sectors, it is evident that structural reform of the sector and the 
establishment of a regulatory agency is much rarer than in the telecoms and power sectors (Estache and Goicoechea 
2005) 
6 The Estache and Goicoechea review is a preliminary review of PSP and regulation in three infrastructure sectors. 
The authors describe it as a ‘rough snapshot’ and the results should be taken only as an indication of the spread of 
reform in infrastructure. In the sample of countries covered in the, 21% of countries have an independent regulatory 
agency for the water sector, compared to 51% for electricity and 66% for telecoms.   4
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we present descriptive statistics from the 
WATSAN database. The data show considerable volatility in numbers of projects signed over the period 
1990-2004. There is a decline from a peak in 1997 to 2003 and a subsequent upturn in 2004. In terms of 
contract types, the data do not support the prevailing view that private investors are switching from ‘high-
risk’ contract types like concessions to ‘low-risk’ management and service-type contracts.
7 On the 
contrary, the WATSAN data show increasing numbers of concession-type contracts. The data also 
document the increasing importance of non-OECD-based investors in the sector and underline the need to 
understand what makes local investors enter into PSP contracts, as well as the forces driving large 
multinational investors. In Section 3, we review the existing literature relevant to PSP determinants and 
develop our hypotheses on ‘handshake’ determinants. In Section 4, we present the data, the selection of 
variables and in section 5 the count outcome regression methodology. In Section 6, we present the results 
of the negative binomial count regression model. Section 7 concludes and suggests directions for future 
research.  
2 – PSP in Water: Descriptive Statistics  
The following stylized facts are often taken to characterize PSP in the water and sanitation sector:  
−  Private investment in the water sector has fallen abruptly since the Asian crisis as a result of 
heightened perceptions of risks on the part of foreign investors 
−  Private investors are no longer willing to invest in high-risk project types, like concessions and 
BOTs, and are turning to management contracts which imply fewer risks 
 
In this section, we present empirical data from the WATSAN database and consider whether these 
statements are an accurate representation of trends. 
 
Investment Trends  
Figure 1 and table 1 show the number of contracts signed by year and by type. This shows a downturn 
from 2000 to 2003, followed by an upturn in 2004. 2004 is the strongest year yet in terms of number of 
deals signed: WATSAN reports 60 new projects in 14 countries in 2004, driven by very high levels of 
activity in the Chinese market.
8 This compares to the findings of the World Bank PPI Database, which 
records 28 projects in 9 countries were invested in 2004 in the water sector.
9   
 
Previous highs were recorded in 1998 and 1999. The high level of investment in these years just after the 
Asian Crisis may seem surprising. However, there is a lag between the firm’s decision to make the 




                                                      
7 These views were expressed, for example, in the Water Operators Roundtable session of the World Bank Water 
Week 1-3 March 2005 (Washington D.C.) See: http://www.worldbank.org/watsan2/waterweek/6.htm 
8 The difference between these two counts is due to (1) better coverage of China in the authors’ database. Chinese 
projects account for 52% of the total signed in 2004; (2) the inclusion of dual desalination and power projects in the 
authors’ database, which make up 8% of projects recorded in 2004 and (3) the cut-off project value for the World 
Bank database. Small projects accounts for 17% of the new contracts awarded in 2004 recorded in WATSAN. 
9 Comparing across sectors in the World Bank PPI database, water and sanitation seems to have been hit hardest by 
the overall downturn in foreign investment from 2000 (Izaguirre & Hunt 2005).  
10 The authors would like to thank Antonio Estache for drawing attention to this point.    5
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Table 1: Water and Sanitation Contracts Awarded (1991-2004) by Project Type (424 observations) 
Year  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
No. contracts 
signed  2  8  9  17 22 20 39 35 45 45 40 36 32 47 27 
BOT-type  2  3  6  11 14 13 28 29 28 31 21 27 19 18 20 
Concession  0 2 2 0 1 1 5 4 1 4 5 6 5 6 5 
Divestiture  0 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 6 2 4 2 4 7 0 
Lease type  0 1 1 4 5 4 4 0 5 5 4 0 2 10  2 




Using a 60-country sample from the WATSAN database, we can see that the proportion of new BOT 
projects signed out of total projects seems to be falling back to the levels of the mid-1990s (Table 1 & 
Figure 2). The falling popularity of BOT projects may be explained by the experience that many countries, 
particularly in the Asian region, have had with this structure.
12 BOTs imply equity risk for the investor, so 
one explanation for the downward trend could be that private players are lo longer willing to act as 
                                                      
11 In the analysis of PSP or what is often labelled public-private partnerships (PPPs), most authors rely on ownership 
categories – BOT, DBFO, lease etc. – that have been developed on an ad hoc basis mostly by law firms. As a 
consequence, there is some overlap between categories and some confusion regarding their analytical uses. For the 
purposes of this paper, we wish to base our categories on underlying economic phenomena: hence we set two proper 
concepts to define PSP contract types: ownership and risk. In this perspective, ‘divestiture’ refers to cases in which 
assets are owned by the private sector and all risk is private; ‘concessions’ refers to cases in which assets are under 
public ownership but the firm has responsibility for financing and implementing all capital investment (financing 
risk) as well as operating the asset for the period of the contract (management risk) and collecting tariffs from end 
users (revenue risk); BOT projects have similar characteristics to the exception that the project’s client is a public 
agency rather than end-users (revenue risk should  thus be lower); A ‘lease’ covers cases where the private sector has 
some responsibility for financing the investment in the maintenance of assets but key responsibilities and ownership 
remain in the public domain; finally, ‘management contracts’ are those under which the private party has no 
responsibility for financing capital investment, does not own the assets and only takes management risk. Thus, with 
the exception of management contracts, all PSP/PPP type projects are by design DBFOs (Design, Build, Finance, 
Operate) 
12 High tariffs paid to BOT suppliers for treated water near to or exceeding the tariffs paid for water by consumers 
have undermined the financial viability of public water utilities, rendering some projects unsustainable. In some 
cases, as in Chengdu, China, demand projections proved to be over-estimated and the use of take-or-pay contracts 
obliges the public utility to use treated water from the high-cost BOT supplier before using lower-cost sources 
(Blanc-Brude and Jensen 2004).   6
investors and finance the capital expenditure of projects. However, this view is contradicted by other 
evidence on concessions, which also involve financing risk. Figure 1 shows the number of new 
concessions signed each year has been constant or rising since 2000.  
 
The data also show that leases and management contracts are growing in popularity as contract models, 
which can be explained by the increasing reluctance of private companies to take equity risk in developing 
regions. China, once again, in an exception to this pattern: there have been several large equity deals in 
recent years.
13   
 
Regional Trends 
Looking at the regional distribution, in Figure 2, Africa has seen a lot fewer deals than Asia and Latin 
America. Figure 1 also shows that lower-middle-income countries have had the greatest number of PSP 
deals, exceeding the number of contracts in upper-middle-income countries.  
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Looking at the distribution of contract types across regions and income groups, we note that there have 
been no divestitures among low-income countries, but divestitures are the second most frequent model in 
the upper-middle-income group. Concessions appear to be most important in the lower-middle-income 
group. Across regions, concessions have been very rare in Europe and most frequent in Asia. Divestitures 
are concentrated in the Latin American region, although there are also some examples in Europe. These 
figures are consistent with the view that investors are more willing to take equity risk (in BOTs, 
divestitures and concessions) in higher-income countries.  
 
International and Local Investors 
There is ample anecdotal evidence for the withdrawal of international private investors from the 
developing world. In 2005, for example, Suez (Ondeo), one of the world’s two largest water service 
companies, announced that it was withdrawing from two major projects, in La Paz-El Alto (Bolivia) and 
Buenos Aires (Argentina). Overall, the World Bank PPI database identifies 20 projects that were either 
cancelled or have become ‘severely distressed,’ accounting for 7 percent of projects and 37 percent of 
investment commitments in 1990–2004 (Izaguirre and Hunt 2005:2). Our WATSAN PSP database 
records 28 terminated projects or 4 per cent of the total number. 
 
However, these well publicized views of a few high profile international investors do not tell the whole 
story. As Figures 3 and 4 demonstrate, private water investment is booming in some parts of the world, 
                                                      
13 Chinese municipalities show little or no interest in management contracts and generally require upfront capital 
investment by the private sector, especially foreign companies (Blanc-Brude and Jensen 2004).   7
notably China (Blanc-Brude and Jensen 2004), driven by both international and local investors and 
elsewhere in Asia and in Latin America, regional and national companies are increasingly active. Local 
investors seem willing to take on financial risks that the largest international water companies are not, and 
are expanding rapidly into new markets.   
 































































Africa Asia Latin America Eastern Europe 
 
 
Using data from our 60-country sample, Figure 4 shows the increasing role of local investors in Latin 
America and Asia, who are taking the place of international companies, which contrasts with the 
established view that the water sector is dominated by a small group of European companies. In fact, 
projects without international involvement constitute the majority of projects in Malaysia and China and 
recent deals in Latin America (Chile and Peru) also point to the ascendancy of domestic companies. 
However, in Europe there are no projects without international involvement and there is only one project 
of this kind in Africa. Figure 4 also shows that most of the new investments in Latin America involve only 
domestic companies while the level of international involvement has collapsed. In contrast, in Asia, the 
growth in project numbers is due to both domestic and foreign investors. Moreover, the latter include 
many regional investors such as Malaysian companies investing in China.  
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In this review of the descriptive statistics, we have noted the recovery in investment levels in 2004 and 
their high degree of concentration in a handful of countries. The WATSAN data also show that the 
common belief that investors are no longer engaging in concession-type contracts is not accurate and that 
local private corporations are increasingly important players in the water and sanitation markets.  In the 
next section, we review the literature pertinent to our analysis of PSP in the water sector, before 
developing and testing our model of PSP with our data.   8
 
3 – Literature Review and Hypotheses: Institutions, Infrastructure and Investment 
The theoretical and empirical literature points to the importance of the following factors in private 
infrastructure investment:  
(a)  Institutions, in particular the rule of law and the protection of property rights.  
(b) The fiscal status of the government emerges as a likely explanatory factor in the government’s 
decision to liberalize the sector for private investment.  
(c)  Low levels of coverage or poor service quality that strengthen the coalition of interests in favour 
of water sector reform and therefore should be associated with greater openness to PSP.  
 
Starting with North, economists have increasingly emphasized the role of institutions in long-term 
development outcomes (North 1981). One strand of this literature has sought to test the relationship 
between institutions and macroeconomic growth, adopting an instrumental variables strategy to cope with 
endogeneity but treating institutions as a ‘package’. Acemoglu and Johnson (2003) take this a step further 
and identify property rights as more significant than contracting institutions. Rigobon and Rodrik (2004) 
find that rule of law has a significant impact on economic performance when considering the multiple 
channels of interaction between institutions and development. Rule of law and property rights institutions 
therefore emerge as promising candidates in explaining the occurrence of PSP contracts. 
 
The theoretical literature on contracts points to the importance of the government’s ‘commitment’ not to 
renegotiate the terms of a contract or change regulatory arrangements ex post (Williamson 1985). The 
government’s ability to demonstrate commitment will be affected by the country’s institutions. Easterly 
and Serven (2003) highlight political stability, policy credibility and the existence of a sound regulatory 
framework as the necessary factors to lower the investor’s perceived risk of expropriation. Other aspects 
of the institutional environment that may be important to commitment are the ability of the bureaucracy to 
implement policy or enforce regulation, or the quality of the legal and judicial systems and the level of 
corruption or sector-specific institutions.
14  
 
Empirical analysis of the impact of institutions raises the problem of endogeneity because private 
investment could be driving regulatory reform. Saleth and Dinar (2004) emphasise these feedback effects 
between institutions and outcomes in their work on the water sector. The water sector seems particularly 
susceptible to this error as PSP has frequently preceded sectoral restructuring legislation. In these 
circumstances, the private partner may exert a direct influence on the kind of regulatory regime created 
and the nature and powers of any regulatory agencies created. Indeed, the regulator may be created at the 
behest of the private partner as a condition for their involvement. We may not therefore maintain the 
assumption that causation runs exclusively from the regulatory arrangements to the level of private 
investment. 
 
To deal with the problem of endogeneity, we use institutional variables that are not affected by private 
investment in the water sector. We choose institutional variables that are sufficiently general, such as the 
‘rule of law’, that we can be confident that the direction of causation runs from the institutions to 
outcomes in the water sector. Thus we can isolate the effect of institutions on private investment.    
 
The firm’s decision to invest will be influenced by the expected risk and return associated with the project. 
In a portfolio of investment projects, we would expect investors to balance high risk-high return projects 
with low risk-low return projects. Many of the factors determining the expected risk-return outcomes will 
be project-specific. However, others will be associated with macroeconomic characteristics. In this 
research, we capture these risks using a composite measure, the ICRG Index of economic risk. 
 
Considering PSP from the government’s point of view brings a further set of considerations. The decision 
by a government to consider PSP in the water sector may be influenced by a number of factors. In 
                                                      
14 The relationship between corruption and private investment is investigated by Everhart and Sumlinski (2001). 
They find that the mechanism driving the negative effect of corruption on private investment levels is due to the 
detrimental impact of corruption on the quality of public investment.   9
particular, a crisis such as a severe drought or flooding might prompt the government to consider reforms, 
including PSP. A financial crisis at the sector level, in which one or many water utilities were unable to 
service their debts, might also prompt action from the government. Secondly, loans or grants from 
multilateral institutions and donors directly or indirectly related to the water sector (such as an urban or 




Secondly, a government may decide to engage in PSP as a result of a macroeconomic crisis, leading to 
reductions in government spending. Infrastructure investment tends to be cut more severely and sooner 
when governments are undertaking programs of fiscal retrenchment than other types of expenditure 
(Calderon, Easterly et al. 2003). In their review of the Latin American experience with economic 
stabilization programs, Easterly and Serven show that governments expect privatization to improve the 
fiscal balance by: generating revenues in the short-term through asset sales; reducing government 
expenditure on operating and capital expenditures; raising tax revenues, although the medium-term fiscal 
effects of privatization are not necessarily positive (Calderon, Easterly et al. 2003). This view is also 
backed up by case studies (Ménard, Clarke et al. 2000a, and others) 
 
A further possible explanation for the level of PSP is the catch-up theory. According to this theory, rates 
of investment will be higher in those countries that are furthest away from the coverage frontier. Henisz 
and Zelner (2001) find evidence for this in their analysis of telecommunications. Coverage and service 
quality for water is low in most low- and lower-middle-income countries, and so we might expect the 
catch-up theory to operate.  
 
However, if we consider the decision of the government to engage in PSP, we should not assume that 
governments choose to reform the sector directly as a result of poor coverage. In fact, it is common for the 
water sector to be stuck in a low-level equilibrium of low tariffs, low investment and low service quality 
(Savedoff, Spiller et al. 1999). Instead, we should see reform in the context of the political economy and 
the result of a confluence of factors strengthening the interest groups in favour of reform (Estache 2005). 
We would expect that governments would introduce reform when the coalition of interests in favor of 
reform had become sufficiently strong to overcome entrenched interests, notably private sector unions.  
 
We use the new WATSAN PSP dataset to test the following key hypotheses emerging from the literature: 
-  H1: Private investors will be more likely to engage in PSP where institutions support government 
commitment to upholding contracts or implementing established regulatory rules. The relevant 
institutions are: protection of property rights; enforcement of contracts; rule of law; ability of the 
bureaucracy to implement policies and rules; political stability; control of corruption.  
-  H2: Developing country governments will engage in PSP when implementing fiscal retrenchment 
-  H3: Governments will be more likely to engage in PSP where demands for increasing coverage or 
quality are strong 
-  H4: Private water companies will be more likely to enter countries where household incomes are 
high enough to support ‘willingness to pay’ for water services 
 
                                                      
15 Field research in Malaysia (Johor State) and Indonesia (Jakarta) revealed a common pattern: the water utility in 
each case received a loan from a donor or development bank to carry out service improvements which was linked to 
considering models for private sector participation in water service delivery.    10
4 – Data and Methodology 
 
The WATSAN Database 
The data currently available on global private investments in the water sector are barely adequate for 
statistical analysis of the sector. The key reference point, the World Bank PPI Database records only a 
subset of the contracts awarded in the sector. While it has good coverage of large projects and those 
involving international investors, it does not cover smaller projects or those involving domestic investors. 
While this might be a little impact on the observation of PSP in the power or telecom sectors, smaller 
projects without international involvement constitute a significant proportion of projects in the water 
sector and small capital investments (below US$20m) often are enough to lead to significant changes in 
sector performance at the municipal level.  
 
We were prompted by the limitations of the existing data to develop a new dataset. The WATSAN PSP 
dataset covers both water and sanitation projects in lower and middle-income countries for the period 
1990-2005. The data has been collected from multiple sources and cross-checked.
16 Data was collected on 
the extent and nature of private involvement, the origin of private partners, investment volumes and 
contract type. This information was not available for all projects. Despite the distinctions that are often 
drawn between types of divestitures, concessions, leases and management contracts, in practice these 




A subset of data, including only signed projects from a sample of 60 developing countries is used for the 
analysis. It contains 460 project observations in 45 countries. We also build control group of 15 other 
developing countries with no active PSP projects in the water and sanitation sector. The countries included 
in the control group have all indicated a willingness to consider PSP in the water and sanitation sector, 
either by introducing a national policy to that effect or engaging in negotiations with one or more private 
investors for a project in the sector. Countries in which PSP in the water sector is expressly forbidden by 
law or policy are not included.
18  
 
The Dependent Variable 
We use the count of PSP contracts signed as our dependent variable (DV) for the regression analysis. 
Other papers on PSP employ investment volumes as the dependent variable. While this offers obvious 
advantages, non-the-least linearity, we refrain from using investment volumes as our dependent variable. 
 
We have concerns about the quality of the data available for private investment volumes in the water 
sector. A first problem arises in the way that the figures are collected. For divestitures, the recorded 
investment figures refer to the purchase price of equity. For concessions, the figures refer to the 
investment commitments made by the concessionaire under the contract. In the World Bank PPI Database, 
equity sales are recorded in the year of the transaction, while investment commitments for concession are 
recorded in the year of financial closure, or in the year of the transaction, where the investments are 
phased and only if this information is known. However, after the initial transaction, information on 
investment levels for concessions is often not made available publicly. Where information is available, it 
seems that the actual level of investment by the private firm may diverge widely from the commitments 
made in the contract. Additionally, a large proportion of PSP contracts in the water sector are renegotiated 
                                                      
16 The sources of data are: World Bank, Thomson Financial, Global Water Intelligence, Water Market China (Blanc-
Brude and Jensen 2004), Water Market Asia (Blanc-Brude and Jensen, 2006) and numerous media and company 
releases. These data are cross-checked in interviews with operators, financiers, legal advisers and international 
institutions. 
17 ‘BOT-type’ includes BROT, BOOT, ROT and DBO contracts. Lease-type contracts include TOT and DBL. O&M 
type includes all contracts that do not require the private party to make any capital investment. See section 2 for a 
discussion of PSP contract acronyms and their limitations as proper economic concepts.  
18 Uruguay introduced a constitutional amendment in 2004 to prevent private provision of water services. However, 
as this decision was made only at the end of the period that we are considering (1990 and 2004), we include Uruguay 
in the dataset.    11




Investment figures are also only available for a smaller sample of projects. These tend to be the largest 
transactions, those involving international investors, and divestitures rather than concessions, generating a 
biased sample of the population of water PSP contracts. 
 
Henisz and Zelner use service outcomes (the number of lines per capita) as the dependent variable in their 
analysis of the telecoms sector (Henisz and Zelner 2001). This approach allows the authors to deal with 
the problem of unproductive investments, but would not allow us to isolate the effect of institutional 
variables on private investment, rather than public investment. In the water sector, private sector 
involvement is often relatively recent, and covers only a small section of the population. We would 
therefore expect the relationship between the level of private sector involvement and infrastructure 
penetration to be weak and we do not pursue the use of outcomes as a dependent variable. Furthermore, 
insufficient data are available on the production volumes or population served by projects and those data 
available come from multiple sources and may be inconsistent and unreliable.  
 
While reliable data on investment volumes (both public and private) or the number of users served by 
public or private would undeniably yield interesting results and allow for OLS-type regression analysis, 
this information does not exist on a reliable basis. Anecdotal evidence collected in Asia by the authors 
indicates that concessionaires sometimes ignore how many people they are serving, while regulators 
ignore how much concessionaires have invested. 
 
Thus, while the count of projects awarded does not reflect the importance of the private sector in 
providing water and sanitation services in a particular country, in the context of the present research, it 
will help explaining the decision of the government and the firm to engage in a partnership, what we have 
labelled “the handshake”.  
 
A final remark is needed on the difference between signed and active projects. Looking at the data, a small 
number of projects have been officially terminated, yielding different figures for the number of contracts 
signed and the number of projects that are currently active. This does not, however, account for the many 
shades of grey between truly active projects and those that, once signed, are still being discussed, 
renegotiated, arbitrated, etc (e.g. Suez’ Manila concession can only be counted as terminated since 2005, 
but has in effect been ‘in distress’ since 1998). The literature and qualitative research undertaken by the 
authors on concession contracts (Jensen, forthcoming PhD thesis) reveal that the decision to terminate a 
contract is very long and complex and we therefore choose to model this separately from the decision to 
engage in PSP, in forthcoming research.   
 
The Independent Variables 
We build a cross section of independent variables (IV) for our sample of 60 countries. Since the DV is the 
cumulative number of PSP projects awarded over a 15-year period, we use mean values to build the cross-
section of IVs. We consider IVs from the following categories:  
-  Market Size: proxied by mean population (1990-2004) 
-  Market Risk: proxied by the ICRG Economic Risk Index (2004) 
-  Ability-to-Pay: proxied by mean GDP per capita (1990-2004) 
-  Sector Performance: proxied by urban “Coverage Gap” (mean urban population multiplied by 
the inverse of the 2002 WHO water coverage estimate for the urban sector) 
-  Public Finance: proxied by mean Debt/ GNI ratio (1990-2004) 
-  Institutions: proxied by the World Bank governance indicators for government efficiency, rule of 
law, political stability, control of corruption (all standardised indices) as well as contract 
enforceability (in number of days to enforce) and the ICRG investment profile index. All values 
for 2004.  
                                                      
19 Field interviews conducted in Manila and Jakarta further substantiate this point.    12
 
Annex C describes the variables and their sources in greater detail. While classic quantitative variables 
such as population or GDP per capita are available for 1990-2004, institutional and risk indices are not. 
Indeed, most of theses indices were created during the latter part of the period under study.  
 
However, the nature of institutions and the way such indices are built are such that the most recent values 
should allow us to capture the effects that we are interested in. The reason for this is twofold: first, 
institutions change very slowly and we are confident that the relative degree of, say, the rule of law, has 
been the same for the past 15 years between Angola and El Salvador or Ethiopia and Turkey. Second, the 
World Bank governance indicators and the ICRG risk indices were built for comparative purposes, to 
capture exactly that kind of variance between countries worldwide, and each individual value only 
changes very little each time the indices are updated. We are confident that using the 2004 value for these 
variables will allow us to capture the cross-country effects we are interested in. However, a further note of 
caution is necessary regarding institutional variables. 
 
It has proved very difficult to generate indicators for institutional quality that capture the relevant aspects 
of institutions. These indicators fall into two categories: objective indicators and perceptions indicators. 
Both are subject to measurement error. Objective indicators often capture only one aspect of the 
underlying institutional phenomenon that is of interest to the researcher. For example, data on the number 
of days that it takes to enforce a contract can be used as an indicator of the quality of legal and judicial 
institutions. However, this is only one of several relevant features of those institutions. Others could 
include corruption or arbitrariness in the system, which may be more important from the investor’s point 
of view. Furthermore, objective indicators often do not capture the implementation of regulation or policy. 
On the other hand, perceptions indicators are subject to measurement error of a different kind: non-
specificity and halo effects, where respondents’ answers are affected by the general level of prosperity in a 
country (Kaufmann, Kraay et al. 2005 ). For the purposes of this research, we employ indices which 
combine objective with perceptions indicators. We are nevertheless well aware of the difficulty of finding 
indicators that reflect adequately underlying institutional attributes. 
 
The Model 
Market size, market risk, ability-to-pay and public finance are assumed to have nonlinear relationship with 
the predicted mean of project count (i.e. the predicted occurrence of PSP contract signature
20). We assume 
that these relationships are best described by the natural log function: beyond a certain threshold, the 
effect of the variable tends to wear off. For instance, we hypothesize that the ability to pay for service will 
partly determine the extent of private sector involvement, but beyond a certain level of wealth, this is 
unlikely to make a difference.  
 
Thus our model is: 
 
PSP = f(Market Size, Market Risk, Ability-to-Pay, Sector Performance, Public Finance, Institutions)  
 
Next, we test for correlation between independent variables. The correlation matrix in Annex A shows that 
institutional variables are highly correlated. To avoid multicolinearity and loss of explanatory power, we 
chose to test each institutional variable separately.  
 
5 - Count Outcome Models and Regression 
Count variables indicate the number of times an event has occurred, and the model estimates the 
probability of the event occurring a certain number of times. The use of regression models for counts is 
relatively recent but has wide ranging applications in social sciences and, in this case, in investment 
decision analysis. Figure 5 describes the counts of signed water PSP contracts in our sample.  
 
                                                      
20 See section 5 and annex D for a detailed explanation of count models and of the regression model used here.   13
While the linear regression model has often been applied to count outcomes, this can result in inefficient, 
inconsistent, and biased estimates. Moreover, count distributions are rarely statistically normal. Even 
though there are situations in which the linear models provide reasonable results, findings can be more 
robust with models specifically designed for count outcomes.  
 
















Observed Counts Cumulative Frequency
 
The univariate Poisson distribution is the foundation of regression models for counts. The Poisson 
regression model (PRM) extends the Poisson distribution by allowing each observation to have a different 
value of µ, the unique value of the mean and variance of the Poisson distribution. In practice the PRM 
rarely fits due to over-dispersion. That is, the model underestimates the amount of dispersion in the 
outcome. The negative binomial regression model (NBRM) addresses the failure of the PRM by adding a 
parameter α that reflects unobserved heterogeneity among observations. 
 
The PRM and the NBRM have the same mean structure. That is, if the assumptions of the NBRM are 
correct, the expected rate for a given level of the independent variables will be the same in both models. 
However, the standard errors in the PRM will be biased downward, resulting in spuriously large z-values 
and spuriously small p-values (Cameron and Trivedi 1998). The NBRM thus appears preferable to the 
PRM. See Annex D for a full analysis of the regression of our dataset comparing the results of the PRM 
and of the NBRM, and Long and Freese (2001) for more details about count outcome regression models.  
 
We estimate our basic model (without the institutional variables) with the NBRM using STATA 8.2.  
Negative binomial regression  Number of obs. = 56  LR chi2(5) = 62.83 
DV: Number of Signed PSP Contracts  Pseudo R2 = 0.2036  Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
  Coefficient  Std Error  Z  P>|z|  [95% Conf. Interval] 
Population  .5880215  .1261757  4.66  0.000  .3407216      .8353213 
GDP per Capita  .9950203  .2148994     4.63    0.000       .5738251  1.416215 
ICRG Risk  3.25384     1.808789     1.80    0.072  -.2913212  6.799002 
Coverage Gap  .0000794  .0000312     2.54    0.011  .0000181      .0001406 
Debt/ GNI  .5546001     .3261312     1.70    0.089  -.0846054  1.193806 
Constant  -28.54979      6.39603     4.46    0.000  -41.08578     -16.01381 
            
Likelihood-ratio test of alpha=0:  chibar2(01) =   36.43 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000 
 
Figure 6 plots the observed and predicted frequencies using the NBRM-fitted model. We can see that the 
model fits the data correctly even though it tends to slightly over estimate the number of zeros
21.  
                                                      
21 The PRM fitted with the same data tends to underestimate zero counts.   14
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6 - Results and Interpretation 
The detailed results for the regression of the different models can be found in Annex A. The following 
table summarises the results in percent change in expected PSP project count for one standard deviation 
increase in X, holding other variables constant. 
 
Percent change in expected project count for one standard deviation increase in X          
Variable   Transf.  Basic Model  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Population  Natural Log  178.8***  148.6***  142.9***  144.9***  140.1***  233.6***  179.9***
GDP per capita  Natural Log  138.4***  158.5***  152.1***  169.5***  156.2***  171.1***  164.9***
Debt/GNI  Natural Log  40*  47.3**  51**  41.3*  47.2**  57.8**  57.3*** 
ICRG Economic Risk Index  Natural Log  39*  31.1  23  34.8*  31.2  24.2  24.7 
Urban Coverage Gap  Raw  44***  45.3***  44***  35***  46.6***  42.8***  55*** 
Rule of Law   Raw     35.4**                
Government Effectiveness  Raw       49.6***             
Political Stability  Raw           31*          
Control of Corruption  Raw              39.3**       
Contract Enforcement  Raw                 -28.7*    
ICRG Investment Profile  Natural Log                    42.7*** 
*** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%                
 
The results should be read (looking at the first cell for the basic model): an increase of one SD of the log 
of the population variable increases the expected mean of project signature count by 178.8% with 99% 
confidence. Likewise, looking at model 1, an increase of one SD of the rule of law index (which 
corresponds, for example, to the difference between the scores of Angola and Argentina) increases the 
expected mean of projects signature count by 35.4% with 95% confidence.  
 
Overall, the results of the regression provide strong support for our hypotheses. The basic components of 
demand for water services, the size of the population and its ability to pay are significant at the 1% level 
and take the expected positive sign in all the models. We also observe that ability-to-pay has an impact on 
PSP that is comparable to the effect of market size.  
 
Turning next to the factors which drive government demand for the involvement of the private sector, we 
find that level of indebtedness of a country is significant in all the models, generally at the 5% level.  
 
We understand this relationship to operate through the following mechanism: governments of more highly 
indebted countries find it more difficult to access credit, putting pressure on the government to engage in 
fiscal stabilization. Governments then reduce their investment expenditure on infrastructure as part of their   15
stabilization efforts as this is less politically costly than reducing current expenditures. In order to 
compensate for this reduction in infrastructure expenditure, the government turns to the private sector for 
project financing.  
 
A second possible mechanism would be that countries with high levels of indebtedness are more likely to 
come under pressure from international financial institutions. However, the effect of the volume of 
multilateral lending (not shown here) did not generate a significant result and had to be dropped. This may 
be because countries which receive large volumes of loans from multilaterals are less likely to have PSP 
projects for other reasons.  
 
A third mechanism linking debt to PSP is the effect on macroeconomic risk faced by investors. More 
indebtedness raises macroeconomic and sovereign risks, discouraging investors from engaging in projects. 
However, the positive sign on the coefficient indicates that the effect of indebtedness on government 
demand for PSP is more powerful than any risk effect on investors.  
 
A more general measure of macroeconomic risk, the ICRG economic risk index, does appear as 
significant at the 10% level in some of the models, but this finding is not robust across all the 
specifications. As we would expect macroeconomic risk to influence the investor’s decision, we interpret 
this finding as an indication that investors are willing to take on more risk if the expected returns from the 
investment are high enough. This is supported by the high proportion of foreign investors in the sector, 
most of whom make investment decisions on a portfolio basis and are thus open to facing high risks in 
emerging markets. Unfortunately, at this stage, we are not able to include a measure of returns in our 
models. An alternative explanation for the absence of significance of the risk variable is that project due 
diligence can be poor and some macro risks badly evaluated ex ante. This last point is supported by many 
of our field interviews with practitioners and legal counsels.  
 
The second driver of government demand for PSP that we test is the urban coverage gap. This is an 
indicator of poor water sector performance and may proxy for the strength of interest group demand for 
the extension of service networks in cities. Ideally, we would include a measure of service quality as well, 
to reflect the demands of existing utility customers for better services, but comparable data is generally not 
available at the national level. The urban coverage gap appears as highly significant in all our models.  
 
Turning to the institutional characteristics of countries, we find that the indicators chosen perform well. In 
particular, we can see that the protection of property rights, reflected in the ICRG investment profile 
indicator, is significant at one percent, as is the measure of bureaucratic quality, ‘government 
effectiveness’.   
 
As the four World Bank governance indicators have the same format (see Annex C), their effects are 
directly comparable. We find that government effectiveness has the biggest positive effect, followed by 
the protection of property rights, the control of corruption and the rule of law. The rule of law indicator, 
which captures the quality of the judiciary, as emphasized by Levy and Spiller (1994), is significant at the 
5% level. This somewhat lower level of significance may reflect the fact that this variable captures aspects 
of the rule of law that are less directly relevant to investors in the infrastructure sector, like the costs of 
common and organized crime and the quality of the police. A similar argument for the dilution of the 
effect of the variable may be made for political stability, which encompasses armed conflict and the risk 
of terrorism as well as the more directly relevant aspects of stability such as frequent or violent regime 
change or the extent of civil unrest.    
 
The contract enforcement variable performs less well, consistent with Acemoglu and Johnson’s findings 
(2003). This variable may reflect better the problems associated with enforcing contracts between private 
parties, which are distinct from the problems associated with public-private agreements. An alternative 
explanation is that infrastructure investment in emerging markets has little to do with enforceability, 
especially for foreign investors, who rely on international arbitration for dispute resolution. Few PSP 
contracts attribute legal competence to local courts and even the likelihood of arbitration awards being   16
enforced is usually limited. In the words of a senior project finance lawyer based in Asia: “a good contract 
gives you a seat at the negotiation table, not more.”
22 
 
The very positive effect of the control of corruption can be surprising at first in a sector (construction) that 
is very prone to corruption and where competitive bidding has not always been the norm. This finding is 
however consistent with most studies of the link between investment, particularly FDI, and corruption 
(Moosa 2002). 
 
However, we must be cautious in interpreting the significance of the different institutional indicators. 
Some of the indicators exhibit multi-collinearity, which suggests that the indicators are capturing some of 
the same underlying institutional attributes for which we do not have more direct indicators. In the 
absence of better indicators that would allow us to ‘unpack’ institutions, the key finding is that the 
institutional indicators as a group do appear as significant. In order to pursue the analysis of the impact of 
institutions on infrastructure investment flows, qualitative analysis would be a promising approach. 
 
7 – Conclusion 
Quantitative research on private participation involvement in the water sector has been held back until 
now by limitations in the data. The poor quality of the data is in turn due to the relatively lower levels of 
investment in water and sanitation and the smaller average project size, compared to other infrastructure 
sectors. International data on infrastructure penetration and the operating and financial performance of 
water utilities that can be used for cross-country analysis is very limited because of the highly fragmented 
structure of the sector. Many national governments do not collect information from municipal and regional 
providers.  
 
The development of the WATSAN PSP database is a first step towards closing this gap in the literature. 
This new database includes well over twice the number of projects covered by the best existing source, the 
World Bank PPI Database. While this constitutes a significant improvement, we are currently deepening 
and strengthening the WATSAN PSP database further to allow for more extensive analysis.  
 
With the information available, we are able to use a negative binomial count regression model to carry out 
a first analysis of the factors affecting PSP contract signature (the “handshake”) in the water and sanitation 
sector. We find that demand for higher coverage levels and constraints on government finances are 
significant variables. Institutions that support the government’s commitment to uphold its agreements with 
private partners and to maintain stable regulatory arrangements are also important. Among these, investor 
protection against expropriation and the quality of the bureaucracy emerge as the most significant. 
However, the indirect measures of institutional characteristics provided by the existing indicators do not 
allow us to identify the underlying institutional attributes that are significant to PSP rates. This points to 
the need for qualitative analysis to help identify these underlying attributes and the mechanisms through 
which they affect investment. 
 
This initial analysis of the new dataset has delivered promising results and suggests a number of areas 
worthy of further investigation. Firstly, the institutions captured in indices like the ‘rule of law’ and 
‘government effectiveness’ developed by the World Bank need to be unpacked. More precise measures of 
the institutions relevant to private investment in infrastructure need to identified and tested. Secondly, 
more information on legal and regulatory structures for water and sanitation across countries is needed to 
study the relationship between these sector-specific institutions and the level of private investment in the 
sector. The operational and financial performance of the sector seems a likely driver for PSP but cannot be 
tested because of the absence of country-level data. Thirdly, the role of international financial institutions 
in shaping government preferences with regard to PSP could be investigated further. Recent research 
pointing to a political backlash against policies linked with IFI involvement suggests a complex and 
interesting relationship (Henisz and Zelner 2004). Finally, it would be interesting to extend the analysis to 
                                                      
22 Interview: Milbank LLP, Singapore, February 2004   17
include the exit decision of investors and the circumstances in which investors choose to terminate a water 
PSP contract.   
 
These preliminary findings point to the existence of economic and institutional determinants to private 
infrastructure and water investment decisions that are sector specific and not necessarily in line with 
traditional findings for investment decisions (especially FDI). The specific characteristics of the sector, its 
political economy, the type of investors involved and the financing of PSP are all worthy of further 
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ANNEX A: Regressions & Correlation Matrix 
 
Negative Binomial Count Model for WATSAN PSP in Developing Countries                
      Basic Model  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Variable   Transf.  Coef (z values)  Coef (z values)  Coef (z values)  Coef (z values)  Coef (z values)  Coef (z values)  Coef (z values) 
                          
Population  Natural Log  .5880215 (4.66)***  .6427902 (5.20)***  .6256657 (5.34)***  .6708151 (5.19)***  .6366447 (5.27)***  .7036564 (5.00)***  .6539809 (5.35)*** 
GDP per capita  Natural Log  .9950203 (4.63)***  .8835992 (4.16)***  .8610534 (4.23)***  .8692786 (4.02)***  .8501009 (3.97)***  1.189205 (5.29)***  .9911512 (4.86)*** 
Debt/GNI  Natural Log  .5546001 (1.70)*  .638496 (2.01)**  .6800456 (2.17)**  .5698847 (1.84)*  .6376125 (2.03)**  .7445108 (2.16)**  .7721402 (2.37)*** 
ICRG Economic Risk Index  Natural Log  3.25384 (1.80)*  2.655701 (1.52)  2.068255 (1.19)  2.932969 (1.70)*  2.669317 (1.55)  2.124386 (1.14)  2.350292 (1.32) 
Urban Coverage Gap  Raw  .0000794 (2.54)***  .0000809 (2.71)***  .000079 (2.74)***  .000065 (2.10)**  .0000828 (2.81)***  .0000752 (2.44)***  .000094 (3.14)*** 
Years since 1st Infra PSP  Raw  (exposure variable)  (exposure variable)  (exposure variable)  (exposure variable)  (exposure variable)  (exposure variable)  (exposure variable) 
                          
Rule of Law   Raw     .490248 (1.92)**                
Government Effectiveness  Raw        .6573652 (2.45)***             
Political Stability  Raw           .3540364 (1.80)*          
Control of Corruption  Raw              .5965077 (1.99)**       
Contract Enforcement  Raw                 -.0014658 (-1.70)*    
ICRG Investment Profile  Natural Log                    1.397096 (2.35)*** 
                          
Intercept     -28.54979 (-4.46)***  -26.38656 (-4.26)***  -24.18575 (-3.91)***  -27.22815 (-4.44)***  -26.09864 (-4.25)***  -27.19408 (-4.35)***  -29.8503 (-4.83)*** 
                          
Observations     56  56  56  56  56  56  55 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square     62.83***  66.38***  68.44***  65.90***  66.71***  63.07***  67.01*** 
Pseudo-R2     0.2036  0.2151  0.2218  0.2135  0.2162  0.2158  0.2182 
Chi/Square(1) test of alpha = 0     36.43***  26.30***  23.52***  26.05***  25.49***  28.01***  31.51*** 
                          
*** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%                   
 
Correlation Matrix                                  




















Population (ln)  1                               
GDP per Capita (ln)  -0.3424  1                            
ICRG Economic Risk (ln)  -0.0325  0.5563  1                         
Urban Coverage Gap  0.6856  -0.2406  0.0882  1                      
Debt/GNI (ln)  -0.1104  -0.499  -0.3544  -0.2503  1                   
Rule of Law  -0.3152  0.6434  0.3823  -0.2283  -0.3802  1                
Government Effectiveness  -0.1747  0.6475  0.4753  -0.0857  -0.4441  0.9443  1             
Political Stability  -0.408  0.5769  0.3719  -0.1734  -0.3075  0.8529  0.8126  1          
Control of Corruption  -0.3497  0.6981  0.4091  -0.2416  -0.3949  0.9455  0.9259  0.7768  1       
Contract Enforcement  0.0977  0.0214  -0.146  0.004  0.0722  -0.2505  -0.2749  -0.2084  -0.245  1    
ICRG Investment Profile (ln)  -0.3468  0.5224  0.3409  -0.2883  -0.3684  0.7205  0.6879  0.7181  0.7062  -0.0706  1 
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ANNEX B: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Descriptive statistics           
   Whole 
Sample   LIC  LMC  UMC  Latin 
America  Africa  Asia  Eastern 
Europe 
Country  60 20 23 17 16 19 13 12 
Number of contracts 
awarded 
460 50  241 168 132 28  253 47 
Mean*  7.67 2.50 10.48  9.88 8.25 1.47 19.46  3.92 
SD  22.29         
Skewness  6.190355         
Kurtosis  43.97063                      
Active projects   433 43  225 165 130 26  230 47 
Early termination  27  8 16  3 2 2 23  0 
active/total  94% 86% 93% 98% 98% 93% 91% 100% 
term/total  6% 16%  7% 2% 2% 7% 9% 0% 
*Mean (outliers correction i.e. China): 5.6, 
SD (outliers correction): 9.34    
 
Projects with international participation        460  Observations 
   Whole sample   LIC  LMC  UMC  LatAm  Africa  Asia  Eastern 
Europe 
Foreign Investor  272  29 138  105  73 27 127  45 
Domestic Investor  188  22 103  63 59 1  126  2 
International/Total  59%  58% 57% 63% 55% 96% 50% 96% 
           
Project type          430  Observations 
   Whole sample   LIC  LMC  UMC  LatAm  Africa  Asia  Eastern 
Europe 
BOT-type  273  24 153  96 92 13 154  14 
Concession  47  5 30  12  10  3 32  2 
Divestiture  30  0 4 26  20  0 5 5 
Lease type  49  12  15  22  6 7 15  21 
O&M  31  10  9 12  4 5 17  5 
 
PSP Counts Frequency Distribution                                              
PSP  Signed  0  1  2  3  4 7  8 11 12 13  14 15 16  19 22 23  27 42 166 
Freq.  16  13  7 5 4  1 2  1 1 1  1 1 1  1 1 1  1 1 1 
Percent  26.7 21.7 11.7 8.33 6.7 1.67 3.3 1.67 1.67 1.7 1.67 1.67 1.7 1.67 1.67 1.7 1.67 1.67 1.7 
Cum.  26.7 48.3 60  68.3 75 76.7 80 81.7 83.3 85 86.7 88.3 90 91.7 93.3 95 96.7 98.3 100 
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ANNEX C: Independent Variables 
 
Variable   Source  Years  Description 
Number of contracts awarded 
(Sum)  WATSAN PSP Database  1990-2004  
Database compiled by the authors. Sources: World Bank PPI Database, Thomson 
Financial, Global Water Intelligence and other media sources, Water Market China. 
Cross-checked through interview with practitioners  
Population (Average)  Economist Intelligence Unit  1990-2004   
GDP per capita (Average)  Economist Intelligence Unit  1990-2004   
ICRG Economic Risk 
 
PRS Group International Country Risk 
Guide  2004 
Composite index of GDP, GDP growth, inflation, budget balance and current account 
balance. The economic risk index scores range from 0-50 points.  
See: http://www.icrgonline.com/page.aspx?page=icrgmethods  
Urban Coverage Gap  Authors  2002 
The variable is constructed using data for urban population and access to improved 
water supply. 
Urban coverage gap = Urban population x (1-urban access to improved water supply)  
Average urban population 1990-2004 (EIU) 
Access to improved water supply (urban areas) 2002 (WHO JMP). See  
http://www.wssinfo.org/  
Years since first infrastructure 
PPP (No.)  World Bank PPI Database  1990-2004 
Count of number of years between the first recorded private investment in 
infrastructure recorded in the database and 2004. A first investment in 2004 receives a 
score of 1. A first investment in 1990 receives a score of 15.  
Rule of Law 
  World Bank Governance Indicators  2004 
Measures the extent to which agents “have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society”. Includes: incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the 
judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. Scores are normalized around 0.  
See: http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/  
Government Effectiveness  World Bank Governance Indicators  2004 
Measures the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the 
competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political 
pressures, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to policies. Scores are 
normalized around 0. 
See: http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/  
Political Stability  World Bank Governance Indicators  2004 
Measure perceptions of the likelihood that the government in power will be 
destabilized or overthrown by possibly unconstitutional and/or violent means, 
including domestic violence and terrorism. Scores are normalized around 0. 
See: http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/  
Control of Corruption 
  World Bank Governance Indicators  2004 
Measures perceptions of corruption, defined as “the exercise of public power for 
private gain.” Includes small-scale and ‘grand’ corruption. Scores are normalized 
around 0. 
See: http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/  
Contract enforcement   World Bank Doing Business Database  2004  Average number of days to enforce a contract 
ICRG Investment Profile  PRS Group International Country Risk 
Guide  2004 
Composite index reflecting contract viability, profits repatriation and payments delays. 
Scores range from 0-15, with a score of 15 for the most attractive investment profile 
See: http://www.icrgonline.com/page.aspx?page=icrgmethods   21
Annex D: Count Outcome Models 
 
This Annex describes how count outcome models can serve the purpose of testing the determinants of the 
PSP projects identified in our database. It borrows heavily from Long and Freese (2001). 
 
The Poisson Distribution 
The univariate Poisson distribution is the foundation of regression models for counts. Let y be a random 
variable indicating the number of times an event has occurred. If y has a Poisson distribution, then:  
Pr(y | µ) = (e
−µ * µ
y )/ y!   for y = 0, 1, 2, . . .     (1) 
where µ > 0 is the sole parameter defining the distribution 
 
µ is the mean of the Poisson distribution. µ is also the variance. Thus, Var(y) = µ, which is known as 
equidispersion. With most datasets, many count variables have a variance greater than their mean, which 
is called overdispersion. As µ increases, the probability of a zero count decreases. Thus, for many count 
variables, there will be observed zeros than predicted by the Poisson distribution.  
 
The Poisson Regression Model 
The Poisson regression model (PRM) extends the Poisson distribution by allowing each observation to 
have a different value of µ. More formally, the PRM assumes that the observed count for observation i is 
drawn from a Poisson distribution with mean µi, where µi is estimated from observed characteristics. This 
is sometimes referred to as incorporating observed heterogeneity, and leads to the structural equation: 
µi = E (yi | xi) = exp(xiβ)        ( 2 )  
 
Using the exponential of xβ forces µ to be positive; this is necessary since counts can only be zero or 
positive. For each value of µ, the distribution around the mean represents the probability of each count. 
Interpretation of the model involves assessing how changes in the independent variables affect the 
conditional mean and the probabilities of various counts. 
 
Exposure time 
In our sample, not all countries introduce PSP in the water sector at the same time. Statistically, different 
observations will have different exposure times i.e. each observation is ‘at risk’ of having a positive count 
for a different amount of time. In our example, each country will have been ‘at risk’ of having a positive 
count of private project for as long as a country’s legal framework allows private participation in the 
water sector. Before that date the probability of counting zero projects is by definition equal to unity, and 
the probability to count more than zero projects is nil.  
 
We create an exposure variable (FIRSTPSP) which measures the number of years since the first private 
infrastructure project (not just in the water sector) was signed in country i. For most countries this signals 
the beginning of reform of public utilities and the point after which a private water project becomes 
possible. The data for FIRSTPSP is drawn from the World Bank’s PPI database.  
 
Exposure times can be incorporated quite simply into count models. Let ti be the amount of time that 
observation i is at risk. If the rate (i.e., the expected number of observations for a single unit of time) for 
that case is µi, then we would expect ti *µi to be the expected count over a period of length ti. Then, 
assuming only two independent variables for simplicity, our count equation becomes: 
 
µi * ti = [exp(β0 + β1x1 + β2x2)] × ti       (3)  
Since t = exp (ln t) we have µi * ti = exp(β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 + lnti) 
 
This shows that the effect of different exposure times can be included as the log of the exposure time with 
a regression coefficient constrained to equal unity. 
   22
The Negative Binomial Regression Model 
We now address over-dispersion in our sample. The PRM accounts for observed heterogeneity (i.e., 
observed differences among sample members) by specifying the rate µi as a function of observed xk’s. In 
practice the PRM rarely fits due to over-dispersion
23. That is, the model underestimates the amount of 
dispersion in the outcome. The negative binomial regression model (NBRM) addresses the failure of the 
PRM by adding a parameter α that reflects unobserved heterogeneity among observations. For example, 
with three independent variables, the PRM is: 
 
µi = exp(β0 + β1xi1 + β2xi2 + β3xi3)     (4) 
 
The NBRM adds an error ε that is assumed to be uncorrelated with the x’s, 
 
µi = exp(β0 + β1xi1 + β2xi2 + β3xi3 + εi) 
= exp(β0 + β1xi1 + β2xi2 + β3xi3) exp(εi) 
= exp(β0 + β1xi1 + β2xi2 + β3xi3) δi 
 
where the second step follows by basic algebra, and the last step simply defines δ ≡ exp (ε). To identify 
the model, we assume that E (δ) = 1 which corresponds to the assumption E(ε) = 0 in the PRM. With this 
assumption, it is easy to show that: 
 
E (µ) = µE (δ) = µ 
 
Thus, the PRM and the NBRM have the same mean structure. That is, if the assumptions of the NBRM 
are correct, the expected rate for a given level of the independent variables will be the same in both 
models. However, the standard errors in the PRM will be biased downward, resulting in spuriously large 
z-values and spuriously small p-values (Cameron and Trivedi 1998). 
 
The distribution of observations given both the values of the x’s and δ is still Poisson in the NBRM. That 
is, 
Pr(yi | xi, δi) = (e
−µi * µ
yi
i ) / yi!       ( 5 )  
 
Since δ is unknown, we cannot compute Pr (y | x). This is resolved by assuming that δ is drawn from a 
gamma distribution (see Long (1997: 231-232) or Cameron and Trivedi (1998:70-79) for details). Then 
we can compute Pr (y | x) as a weighted combination of Pr (y | x, δ) for all values of δ, where the weights 
are determined by Pr (δ). This leads to the negative binomial distribution:  
 
Pr (y | x) = [Γ(y + α




α−1 * [µ/ (α−1 + µ)]
y   
where Γ  is  the  gamma  function.       (6) 
 
The larger value of α, the greater spread in the data; indeed, if α = 0, the NBRM reduces to the PRM, 
which turns out to be the key to testing for over-dispersion. 
 
                                                      
23 Using STATA 8.2 SE, we fit the Poisson regression for our basic model. As with most Poisson regressions applied to real-world data, we find 
a poor fit. Various measures of pseudo and adjusted R-squared are suspiciously high and the Chi-Square test for the goodness of fit of the 
regression forces us to reject the null hypothesis that our distribution is a Poisson distribution. The bad fit of the PRM is not a surprise since the 
standard deviation of our distribution is about three times the mean. This is partly due to the very high number of PSP projects in China. Even 
after for correcting for outliers (China), the SD of the distribution (9.34) is still almost twice the mean (5.6) – See Annex B for detailed 
descriptive statistics. 
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We estimate our basic model (without the institutional variables) with the NBRM using STATA 8.2.  
 
Negative binomial regression                      Number of obs   =         56 
                                                  LR chi2(5)      =      62.83 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -122.88584                       Pseudo R2       =     0.2036 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   PSPSIGNED |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  LOGPOPMEAN |   .5880215   .1261757     4.66   0.000     .3407216    .8353213 
LOGGDPCAPM~N |   .9950203   .2148994     4.63   0.000     .5738251    1.416215 
  LOGICRGECO |    3.25384   1.808789     1.80   0.072    -.2913212    6.799002 
 COVERAGEGAP |   .0000794   .0000312     2.54   0.011     .0000181    .0001406 
 LOGBDEBTGNI |   .5546001   .3261312     1.70   0.089    -.0846054    1.193806 
       _cons |  -28.54979    6.39603    -4.46   0.000    -41.08578   -16.01381 
    FIRSTPPP | (exposure) 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    /lnalpha |  -.8124094   .3793467                     -1.555915   -.0689036 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       alpha |   .4437875   .1683493                      .2109962    .9334167 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Likelihood-ratio test of alpha=0:  chibar2(01) =   36.43 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000 
 
Measures of Fit for nbreg of PSPSIGNED 
 
Log-Lik Intercept Only:     -154.302     Log-Lik Full Model:         -122.886 
D(49):                       245.772     LR(5):                        62.833 
                                         Prob > LR:                     0.000 
McFadden's R2:                 0.204     McFadden's Adj R2:             0.158 
Maximum Likelihood R2:         0.674     Cragg & Uhler's R2:            0.677 
AIC:                           4.639     AIC*n:                       259.772 
BIC:                          48.529     BIC':                        -42.706 








0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Observed Frequencies NBREG Predictions
 
 
The LR test for H0: alpha = 0 is highly significant and we can reject the null hypothesis and conclude that 
there is significant evidence of over-dispersion. From this and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 
we can see that the NBRM is to be preferred to the PRM.  
 
Figure 6 plots the observed and predicted frequencies using the NBRM-fitted model. We can see that the 
model fits the data correctly even though it tends to slightly over estimate the number of zeros
24. Having 
determined that the NBRM fits our data best, we can now test the different versions of the model.   
 
                                                      





Abdala, M. (1996). "Welfare effects of Buenos Aires' water and sewerage services privatization." 
Acemoglu, D. and S. Johnson (2003). "Unbundling institutions." National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Working Paper Series No. 9934: 1-[63]. 
Alcázar, L., M. A. Abdala, et al. (2000). The Buenos Aires Water Concession. Washington, DC, World 
Bank Development Research Group Regulation and Competition Policy. 
Alcázar, L., L. C. Xu, et al. (2000). Institutions, politics, and contracts : the attempt to privatize the water 
and sanitation utility of Lima, Peru. Washington, DC, World Bank Development Research Group 
Regulation and Competition Policy. 
Birdsall, N. and J. Nellis, Eds. (2005). Reality Check: The Distributional Impact of Privatization in 
Developing Countries. Washington DC, The centre for Global Development. 
Blanc-Brude, F. and O. Jensen (2004). Water Market China: Projects and Opportunities in the Water and 
Wastewater Sectors. Oxford, Media Analytics. 
Calderon, C., W. Easterly, et al. (2003). Infrastructure Compression and Public Sector Solvency in Latin 
America. The Limits of Stabilization: Infrastructure, Public Deficits and Growth in Latin 
America. W. Easterly and L. Serven. Washington D.C., IBRD/World Bank. 
Calderon, C., W. Easterly, et al. (2003). Latin America's Infrastructure in the Era of Macroeconomic 
Crisis. The Limits of Stabilization: Infrastructure, Public Deficits and Growth in Latin America. 
W. Easterly and L. Serven. Washington D.C., IBRD/WorldBank. 
Cameron, A. C. and P. K. Trivedi (1998). Regression Analysis of Count Data. Cambridge, UK, 
Cambridge University Press. 
Easterly, W. R. and L. Serven (2003). The limits of stabilization : infrastructure, public deficits and 
growth in Latin America. Washington, DC, World Bank. 
Estache, A. (2005). "PPI partnerships versus PPI divorces in LDCs." World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper(3470). 
Estache, A. and A. Goicoechea (2005). "How widespread were private investment and regulatory reform 
in infrastructure utilities during the 1990s?" World Bank Policy Research Working Paper(3595). 
Estache, A. and M. E. Pinglo (2004). "Are Returns to Private Infrastructure in Developing Countries 
Consistent with Risks Since the Asian Crisis?" World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper(3373). 
Everhart, S. S. and M. A. Sumlinski (2001). "Trends in Private Investment in Developing Countries and 
the Impact on Private Investment of Corruption and the Quality of Public Investment." 
International Finance Corporation Discussion Paper No. 44. 
Foster, V. (2005). "Ten Years of Water Service Reform in Latin America: Toward an Anglo-French 
Model." World Bank Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Board Discussion Paper Series (Paper 
No 3). 
Guasch, J. L. (2004). Granting and renegotiating infrastructure concessions : Doing it Right. Washington, 
D.C., World Bank. 
Henisz, W. J. (2002). "The Institutional Environment for Infrastructure Investment." Industrial and 
Corporate Change 11(2): 355-89. 
Henisz, W. J. and B. A. Zelner (2001). "The Institutional Environment for Telecommunications 
Investment." Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 10(1): 123-147. 
Henisz, W. J. and B. A. Zelner (2004). Resistance to Illegitimate Multilateral Influence on Reform: The 
Political Backlash Against Private Infrastructure Investments. Mimeo, University of 
Pennsylvania. 
Izaguirre, A. K. and C. Hunt (2005). "Private Water Projects." World Bank Public Policy for the Private 
Sector Series Note No. 297  
Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay, et al. (2005 ). "Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996-2004." 
World Bank     25
Levy, B. and P. T. Spiller (1994). "The institutional foundations of regulatory commitment: a comparative 
analysis of telecommunications regulation." Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 10(2). 
Long, J. S. (1997). Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables. Los Angeles, 
UCLA. 
Long, J. S. and J. Freese (2001). Regression models for categorical independent variables. College 
Station, Texas, STATA Press. 
Ménard, C., G. Clarke, et al. (2000). Reforming the water supply in Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire : mild reform 
in a turbulent environment. Washington, D.C., World Bank Development Research Group Public 
Economics. 
Ménard, C., G. Clarke, et al. (2000). A transitory regime : water supply in Conakry, Guinea. Washington, 
D.C, World Bank Development Research Group Public Economics and Regulations and 
Competition Policy. 
Moosa, I. A. (2002). Foreign Direct Investment: Theory, Evidence and Practice. Basingstoke, Hampshire, 
Houndmills. 
North, D. C. (1981). Structure and change in economic history. New York, Norton. 
Rigobón, R. and D. Rodrik (2004). "Rule of law, democracy, openness and income: estimating the 
interrelationships." Centre for Economic Policy Research. Discussion Paper Series No. 4653: 1-
28. 
Saleth, R. M., A. Dinar, et al. (2004). The institutional economics of water : a cross-country analysis of 
institutions and performance. Cheltenham, U.K. ; Northhampton, Mass.A, E. Elgar Pub. 
Savedoff, W. D., P. T. Spiller, et al. (1999). Spilled water : institutional commitment in the provision of 
water services. Washington, D.C., Inter-American Development Bank. 
Shirley, M. M., L. C. Xu, et al. (2000). Reforming urban water supply : the case of Chile. Washington, 
DC, World Bank Development Research Group Regulation and Competition Policy  
Sirtaine, S., M. E. Pinglo, et al. (2004). "How Profitable are Infrastructure Concessions in Latin America? 
Empirical Evidence and Regulatory Implications " World Bank Report  
Williamson, O. E. (1985). The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York, Free Press. 
 
* 